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1. Introduction 
 
This research was conducted for the Shades of Grey EPSRC 
research project (EP/H02302X/1) which aims to develop scientif c 
interventions for eliciting robust and reliable indicators of suspi- 
cious behaviour. The project was funded in response to an increase 
in acts associated with terrorism (Home Off ce Statistical Bulletin, 
2010). This study was conducted as part of a work package which 
aimed to investigate mechanisms for revealing behavioural cues to 
deception. 
Prior research has demonstrated that there is no single, reliable 
cue to deceptive behaviour (Vrij, 2004). However, liars may expe- 
rience one or more of three interlinking processes: emotion, 
cognitive effort and attempted behavioural control, which evoke 
verbal, non-verbal or physiological responses that differ to those 
made by truth-tellers (Zuckerman et al., 1981; Vrij, 2004). While 
other papers in this special issue focus on speech (Kirchhüebel and 
Howard, in press) and physiological aspects (Eachus et al., in press) 
of deception, this study aimed to investigate non-verbal behaviour. 
Several non-verbal behaviours have previously been associated 
with the processes mentioned above, although the effect sizes are 
 
 
often small and hence these behaviours only provide weak cues to 
deception (e.g. DePaulo et al., 2003). 
The emotions associated with deception include fear (of being 
caught), guilt (for acting deceptively) and duping delight (a conse- 
quence of success or anticipated success in a deceptive act) (Ekman, 
1985). Fear and duping delight may both result in signs of arousal in 
the deceiver, for example an increase in limb movements (Vrij, 
2008). Excitement (caused by duping delight) may also result in 
signs of joy, such as smiling (Memon et al., 2003), whereas guilt is 
more likely to result in gaze aversion (Vrij, 2008). Furthermore, as 
part of their deception liars may have cause to mask signs of the 
true emotion they are experiencing. The effects of this masking can 
fail, in which case emotional leakage, identif able in facial expres- 
sions, can provide an indication of deception (Ekman and 
O’Sullivan, 2006). 
Lying sometimes requires greater mental and cognitive effort 
than truth-telling. Because deceivers might be pre-occupied by 
creating lies, they need to pay special attention to their behaviour 
(Vrij, 2008). They must also monitor the reactions of their targets, 
and suppress the truth when lying. These activities all require 
cognitive effort (Walczyk et al., 2003, 2005; Vrij, 2008; Carrión 
et al., 2010).  Engaging in cognitive complexity can result in 
changes in the frequency or speed of gestures (Ekman and 
O’Sullivan, 2006), less blinking (Bagley and Manelis, 1979), and 
more gaze aversion (Ekman, 1997). Cognitive effort may also result 
 
    
in a decrease in body movements, since the high demand leads to 
the neglect of body language (Vrij, 2008). 
Liars adjust their behaviours during a deceptive act by moni- 
toring the reactions from their targets (Buller and Burgoon, 1996). 
Perceiving, monitoring and communicating with targets helps liars 
to successfully deceive (e.g. Burgoon et al., 2001, 2008). To appear 
honest or normal, liars may attempt to control their behaviour 
during deception. Some evidence shows that liars try to exhibit 
behaviour which they believe is credible, such as trying to behave 
positively and friendly (DePaulo et al., 2003). However, this delib- 
erate self-regulation can sometimes make liars appear over- 
controlled (Vrij, 2008). Thus, attempted behavioural control can 
result in liars who look too rigid and tense (Memon et al., 2003; 
DePaulo et al., 2003). 
This study aimed to investigate a forced increase in self- 
awareness as a mechanism to amplify behavioural differences 
between truth-tellers and liars. Raised self-awareness has previ- 
ously been shown to affect performance through focus and evalu- 
ation of oneself. For example, Wicklund and Duval (1971) found 
that performance on a writing task improved when participants 
faced a mirror, which was explained through their increased self- 
awareness and greater focus on themselves and their standard of 
performance. Thus, while a mirror is an effective tool for raising 
self-awareness (Fenigstein et al., 1975), the effects of this on 
deceivers had not previously been investigated. In this study, the 
mirror was used to investigate whether greater self-awareness 
would increase the emotion, cognitive effort, and attempted 
behavioural control experienced by deceivers, and hence exag- 
gerate the differences in non-verbal behaviour between them and 
truth-tellers. Furthermore, existing research has often been based 
on participants’ behaviour during interviews in which they are 
required to act deceptively, which as discussed above has revealed 
few strong cues to deception (DePaulo et al., 2003; Vrij, 2004). This 
study aimed to investigate cues to deception exhibited by people as 
they prepared to act deceptively, prior to the interview starting. The 
outcome of this research could be used to support security 
personnel, for example as they monitor suspects in a waiting area 
prior to interview. 
A summarised version of this study is provided by Lawson et al. 
(2011). Full details are provided in the following sections. 
 
2. Method 
 
2.1. Participants 
 
In this study 80 participants were recruited: 39 male and  41 
female (mean age ¼ 20.14 years, SD ¼ 1.30 years, range ¼ 18e24 
years). All were undergraduate students from the University of 
Nottingham. Recruitment was conducted by opportunistic partici- 
pant self-selection in response to posters around the campus and 
emails sent to student mailing lists. These specif ed that applicants 
should not suffer from any mental ill-health. This was a require- 
ment of the University of Nottingham Faculty of Engineering Ethics 
Committee to minimise the impact of any potential distress 
participants might have experienced when expecting to lie in the 
deception condition. The self-selection process also avoided the 
necessity for participants to reveal any mental health conditions to 
the experimenter, thus there was no further screening for this 
criteria. 
 
2.2. Apparatus/equipment 
 
The experiment was conducted in a small laboratory which 
contained a reception area and an interview area with chairs for the 
participant and the interviewer (Fig. 1). Fig. 1a shows the high-self 
awareness (i.e. mirror) condition; for the low-self awareness (i.e. no 
mirror) condition the mirror was removed from the room. The 
environment was deliberately created such that it was relatively 
distraction free: participants could not see out of any windows and 
objects were removed from the walls. Only the participant and the 
researcher were allowed access to the laboratory during the 
experiment. 
Fig. 1b was taken from the participant’s seat looking towards the 
interviewer’s seat. A camcorder, used to capture participants’ 
movements, was hidden within the large green box f le (Fig. 1c). 
The aperture on the f le had to be widened to enable the camera to 
capture the area in which the participant was seated. Thus, it was 
possible to identify the lens, but only with close attention. Typical 
off ce products (glue stick, CD, marker pen) were located around 
the aperture to divert the participants’ attention from the lens. 
The short state-trait anxiety inventory (STAI) questionnaire 
(Marteau and Bekker, 1992) was also used in the trial, unchanged 
from its original form. This determines anxiety based on 4-point 
subjective rating scales for six associated states, namely: calm, 
tense, upset, relaxed, content, and worry. This was used to gain 
some understanding of the emotional state of the participant, in 
particular an indication of whether there was greater fear (of 
getting caught) in those intending to deceive (Vrij, 2004). 
 
2.3. Experimental design 
 
A 2*2 between-subjects design was developed for this experi- 
ment, with the independent variables of self-awareness and 
deception. Self-awareness contained two levels: high and low. In 
 
  
Fig. 1. (a) Interview room set-up (high-self awareness condition); (b) View to the right from the participant’s seat; (c) Close up of objects in the interview area. The largest folder 
contains a covert camera. 
 the high self-awareness condition, participants faced a full length 
mirror during the waiting period (Fig. 1a). In the low self-awareness 
condition the mirror was removed and participants faced a blank 
wall. Deception also contained two levels: truth/lying. In the truth 
condition participants were told that during the interview they 
were to answer all questions truthfully; in the lying condition 
participants were told to give no truthful answers during the 
interview. Thus, four experimental conditions were developed, 
each with 20 participants (Table 1). A random number generator 
was used to assign each participant to one of these conditions 
before they arrived at the trial. 
 
2.4. Procedure 
 
Participants were recruited expecting to take part in a trial to 
investigate deception skills in interview. Before each participant 
arrived, the hidden video camera was started. Upon arrival, 
participants were f rst taken to a reception area where a researcher 
re-iterated that the study was being conducted as part of research 
into deception skills in interview; no other details about the 
purpose of the study were provided. The researcher explained that 
when the trial started, an interviewer would arrive and ask them 
about their degree courses. It was also explained that the questions 
would not be of a sensitive nature (e.g. name, degree course, year of 
study, favourite module and number of people on your course). 
Depending on the condition, participants were told that they 
should either give the correct answers (e.g. truth condition) or give 
no truthful responses (e.g. lying condition). They were told that the 
interviewer would not know to which condition the participants 
had been assigned. Participants’ were asked if they were happy to 
continue after this initial instruction, and if so informed consent to 
participate was recorded. They were then asked to complete the 
short form STAI (Marteau and Bekker, 1992). 
The researcher then led the participant to interview area (Fig. 1). 
The researcher asked the participant to wait for the interviewer to 
arrive. He told the participant he would return at the end of the 
session to organise the £10 gratuity payment. The researcher then 
left the room under the pretence of f nding the interviewer, 
although he actually hid outside the laboratory and waited for 
5 min. 
After this period, the researcher re-entered the room and 
apologised for the delay. He told the participant that he had spoken 
to the interviewer, who would arrive shortly. The participant was 
asked to re-complete the short form STAI (Marteau and Bekker, 
1992) for how they felt at that moment in time. This was again 
used to understand the emotional state of the participant, and to 
investigate whether anxiety had changed over the waiting period. 
The researcher then asked the participant to return to the 
reception area. He told the participant that there was not actually 
going to be an interview, and that they had been recorded during 
the waiting period. The participant was asked to estimate how long 
they had been waiting. Finally, they were fully de-briefed and given 
the option to review or delete the video footage; if this was not 
required they were asked to  sign consent for the data to be 
analysed. 
  
Table 1 
Experimental conditions. 
3. Results 
 
3.1. Body movement 
 
The video footage taken using the covert camera was analysed 
using the ObserverPro software. The coding scheme was based on 
previous research into cues to deception described in the intro- 
duction (Ekman, 1997; DePaulo et al., 2003; Memon et al., 2003; 
Vrij, 2004, 2008; Ekman and O’Sullivan, 2006) but was simplif ed 
due to the practical requirements for coding, and due to an 
emphasis on coarse gestures in the funding project. The coding 
scheme used is shown in Table 2. Hand or arm movement includes 
any f nger, hand or arm movement on either left, right or both sides. 
Similarly foot or leg includes movement of the relevant body parts 
on left, right or both sides. 
While all 80 participants were coded by a single researcher, 8 
participants (10%) were randomly selected to be coded by a second 
researcher to investigate inter-rater reliability. These data were not 
used in the analysis of the behaviours, only to investigate reliability. 
Cohen’s Kappa was found to be towards the upper limits of 
“moderate” agreement (Kappa ¼ 0.57; p < 0.01) (moderate agree- 
ment: 0.41e0.6; substantial agreement: 0.61e0.80; Landis and Koch, 
1977). This relatively low agreement was investigated further with 
correlations of the duration and frequency of movements. For each 
movement category and for the directions of gaze the results were 
correlated between the raters, for both duration and frequencies. 
The results are shown in Table 3. 
The durations all demonstrated signif cant f ndings and large 
effect sizes (r � 0.5 according to the values given by Cohen (1988)). 
The frequencies of “hand/arm movement” and gaze directions for 
“camera” and “other” demonstrated less reliability between the 
raters. Given that only the data from the primary-rater were used in 
this study, the results were deemed acceptable. However, future 
work should aim to increase the reliability of the coding taxonomy, 
particularly for frequencies of acts. 
The results (as coded by the primary researcher) are shown 
below. Initially MANOVAs were run to investigate the duration of 
movements (i.e. total time spent moving) and frequency of move- 
ments (i.e. total number of times the body part was moved 
regardless of duration) for hands/arms, feet/legs and whole body/ 
torso. Signif cant f ndings were followed up with further tests. As 
the specif c direction of gaze was measured (rather than 
movement/non-movement for the other dependant variables) this 
was investigated separately and is reported in Sections 3.1.5 and 
3.1.6. All results were tested for signif cance at p < 0.05. 
 
3.1.1. Body part movement MANOVAs 
The hands/arms, feet/legs, whole body/torso movement data 
were investigated using 2*2*3 (deception*self-awareness*body 
part) MANOVAs for both duration and frequencies of movements. 
The results for duration of movement are shown in Table 4. 
The signif cant main effect for body part indicates that people 
moved each body part differently. Post hoc pairwise comparisons 
with Bonferroni correction revealed differences between each body 
part (hand/arms  and  whole  body:  mean  difference  ¼ 164.947; 
p < 0.001; hand/arms and feet/legs: mean difference ¼ 96.225; 
   Table 2 
Self-awareness Coding scheme. 
 
  High Low Hand or arm Foot or leg Whole body Gaze direction 
Deception level Truth 1 2 (either left or right)   (either left or right)    or torso 
   
Lying 
(mirror/truth) 
3 
(mirror/lying) 
(no mirror/truth) 
4 
(no mirror/lying)
  Moving 
Still 
Moving 
Still 
Moving 
Still 
Directly forwards 
Towards camera 
Other 
  
Table 3 Table 5
 
Pearson’s correlation (rp) between primary and secondary raters. 
Body part Duration Frequency 
Hand/arm rp ¼ 0.968; n ¼ 8; p < 0.001*    rp ¼ 0.509; n ¼ 8; p ¼ 0.198 
Foot/leg rp ¼ 0.979; n ¼ 8; p < 0.001*    rp ¼ 0.766; n ¼ 8; p ¼ 0.027* 
Body/torso rp ¼ 0.924; n ¼ 8; p ¼ 0.001*    rp ¼ 0.929; n ¼ 8; p ¼ 0.001* 
Gaze: forwards    rp ¼ 0.751; n ¼ 8; p ¼ 0.032*    rp ¼ 0.872; n ¼ 8; p ¼ 0.005* 
Gaze: camera rp ¼ 0.873; n ¼ 8; p ¼ 0.005*    rp ¼ 0.552; n ¼ 8; p ¼ 0.156 
Gaze: other rp ¼ 0.763; n ¼ 8; p ¼ 0.028*    rp ¼ 0.523; n ¼ 8; p ¼ 0.184 
 
*Indicates signif cance at p < 0.05.   
p <  0.001;  whole  body/torso  and  feet/legs:  mean 
difference ¼ -68.723; p < 0.001). Descriptive statistics for body 
part durations are shown in Table 5. 
Arguably more interesting is the interaction between body 
part*deception*self-awareness shown in Table 4, which indicates 
that body part movements were inf uenced differently based on 
deception and self-awareness. This is investigated further with 
ANOVAs for each body part in Sections 3.1.2e3.1.4. 
The results of the MANOVA for frequency of body part move- 
ments is shown in Table 6. Only body part reveals a signif cant 
difference. 
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction indicate 
differences between hand/arm and whole body/torso (mean 
difference ¼ 4.550; p < 0.001) and whole body/torso and feet/legs 
(mean difference ¼ -5.875; p < 0.001).  There  was  no 
signif cant difference between hand/arm and feet/legs (mean 
difference ¼ -1.325; p ¼ 0.053).  The descriptive statistics are 
shown in Table 7. 
As no interaction was seen in Table 6, the frequency of body 
movements were not investigated further with individual ANOVAs. 
 
3.1.2. Hands/arms: duration of movements 
Hand and arm movement was f rst investigated using  a 2*2 
(deception*self-awareness) between-subjects ANOVA. The results 
for duration of movement are shown in Table 8. This demonstrates 
a signif cant interaction between deception and  self-awareness. 
The interaction plot in Fig. 2 shows that without a mirror, partici- 
pants expecting to tell  the truth  spend more time moving their 
hands than those expecting to lie; the opposite was observed in the 
mirror condition. 
The descriptive statistics for the durations of hand/arm move- 
ments are shown in Table 9 below. 
 
3.1.3. Legs/feet: duration of movement 
No signif cant main effects, or interaction, were found for 
duration of leg/foot movements (Table 10). 
 
3.1.4. Whole body/torso: duration of movements 
A main effect of self-awareness was found for duration of whole 
body/torso movements (Table 11). Those with the mirror spent 
longer moving (mean duration: 28.584 s; SD ¼ 46.192) than those 
without the mirror (mean duration: 12.225 s; SD ¼ 11.838). No 
Descriptive statistics for duration (seconds) of body part movements. 
 
Body part Mean Standard deviation 
Hand/arm 185.351 68.859 
Feet/legs 89.127 57.716 
     Whole body/torso 20.405 34.501   
  
signif cant main effect  was  seen for deception,  or interaction 
between deception and self-awareness. 
 
3.1.5. Gaze direction: duration 
The dependant variable for gaze direction  contained three 
levels: directly forwards, towards camera and other. Therefore, this 
was investigated using a 2*2*3 mixed ANOVA, with the variables of 
deception (expecting to lie/expecting to tell the truth), self- 
awareness (high/low) and gaze direction (described above). 
A main effect was seen for gaze direction, with most time spent 
looking at “other” (mean ¼ 205.682; SD ¼ 67.350) followed by 
“forward” (mean ¼ 65.879; SD ¼ 67.885) and f nally looking 
towards the “camera” (mean ¼ 28.440; SD ¼ 23.957). Pairwise 
comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed signif cant 
differences  between  each  gaze  direction  (forward-camera:  mean 
difference    ¼    37.439;    p    <   0.001;    forward-other:    mean 
difference    ¼   -139.803;    p    <   0.001;    camera-other:    mean 
difference ¼ -177.242; p < 0.001). A signif cant interaction for gaze 
direction and self-awareness can also be seen in Table 12, indicating 
a change in gaze direction in the presence/absence of a mirror. 
 
3.1.6. Gaze direction: frequency 
For frequencies, the main effect of gaze direction was found to 
be  signif cant  with   the   highest   frequency   for   “other” 
(mean ¼ 11.925; SD ¼ 5.233) followed by “camera” (mean ¼ 7.375; 
SD ¼ 3.921) and f nally “forward” (mean ¼ 6.450; SD ¼ 5.348). 
Pairwise comparisons with Bonferroni correction revealed signif - 
cant  differences  between  forward   and   other   (mean 
difference ¼ -5.475; p < 0.001) and camera and other (mean 
difference ¼ -4.550; p < 0.001). There was no signif cant difference 
between   forward   and   camera   (mean   difference   ¼   -0.925; 
p ¼ 0.416). Table 13 shows that the interaction between direction 
and self-awareness was found to be signif cant (as for durations), 
which indicates a change in gaze direction in the presence/absence 
of a mirror. The main effect of self-awareness revealed a higher 
frequency of gaze (i.e. a greater number of changes in gaze direc- 
tion) in the presence of a mirror (mean ¼ 9.758; SD ¼ 5.657) than 
without (mean ¼ 7.408; SD ¼ 4.914). 
 
3.2. State-trait anxiety questionnaire 
 
A score was derived from the short form state-trait anxiety 
(STAI) questionnaire by summing the ratings for each scale item 
(positive items, e.g. I feel calm were negatively scored). Mean values 
were calculated for the anxiety score across each group. This was 
done for the scores obtained prior to the waiting period, and 
immediately after the 5 min wait, before the participants had been 
told there would be no interview (Fig. 3). 
 
Table 4 
MANOVA for duration of body part movements. 
Table 6 
MANOVA for frequency of body part movements. 
 
Effect Fa df p Eta2 Effect Fa df p Eta2 
Body part 211.375 2,75 <0.001* 0.849 Body part 82.743 2,75 <0.001* 0.688 
Body part*deception 1.668 2,75 0.196 0.043 Body part*deception 0.244 2,75 0.784 0.006 
Body part*self awareness 0.165 2,75 0.849 0.004 Body part*self awareness 0.175 2,75 0.840 0.005 
Body  part*deception*self-awareness 3.505 2,75 0.035* 0.085 Body  part*deception*self-awareness 0.292 2,75 0.748 0.008 
*Indicates signif cance at p < 0.05. 
a  Pillai’s Trace. 
*Indicates signif cance at p < 0.05. 
a  Pillai’s Trace. 
 691 
Effect F df p Eta2 
Deception level 3.635 1,76 0.060 0.046 
Self-awareness 5.035 1,76 0.028* 0.062 
   
Self-awareness 0.807 1,76 0.372 0.011 
Deception*self-awareness 2.125 1,76 0.149 0.027 
 
Table 7 
Descriptive statistics for frequency of body part movements. 
Table 9 
Means   (and   standard   deviations)   for   the   duration   (seconds)   of   hand/arm 
movements. 
Body part Mean Standard deviation    
Hand/arm 8.225  3.785 
Feet/legs 9.550  4.121 
Whole body/torso 3.675  3.056 
Deception Self-awareness 
 
High Low 
Truth-tellers 174.934(63.873) 198.597(83.427) 
Liars 203.834(53.077) 164.042(68.710) 
 
Table 8 
ANOVA for duration of hand/arm movements. 
   Table 10 
Effect F df p Eta2 ANOVA for duration of leg/foot movements. 
 
Deception level 0.034 1,76 0.853 0.000 Effect F df p Eta2 
Self-awareness 0.280 1,76 0.598 0.004
Deception*self-awareness 4.335 1,76 0.041* 
0 054
Deception level 0.386 1,76 0.536  0.005
 
*Indicates signif cance at p < 0.05.  
A 2*2*2 mixed ANOVA (deception*self-awareness*pre/post 
trial) was run to investigate further the state-trait anxiety scores. 
The results, shown in Table 14, show signif cant main effects of 
deception and timing (pre/post trial). Regarding deception, those 
who were lying had greater anxiety (mean ¼ 10.863; SD ¼ 2.427) 
than those who were telling the truth (mean ¼ 9.150; SD ¼ 2.392). 
For   timing,   anxiety   increased   over   the   waiting   period   from 
mean ¼ 9.713; SD ¼ 2.517 to mean ¼ 10.300; SD ¼ 2.568. 
 
3.3. Time waiting estimates 
 
Finally, participants’ responses to the question “how long do you 
think you were waiting” were analysed. A main effect was seen for 
deception level (Table 15), with truth tellers reporting a longer 
waiting period (mean ¼ 4.774; SD ¼ 1.494) than those expecting to 
deceive (mean ¼ 3.967; SD ¼ 1.531) (Fig. 4). 
 
4. Discussion 
 
In this study, few differences in body movements were found 
between  participants  expecting  to  act  deceptively  and  those 
 
expecting to tell the truth. The most notable f nding was an inter- 
action between self-awareness and deception for the duration of 
hand/arm movements. Participants in the lying condition moved 
their arms more in the presence of a mirror; truth-tellers moved 
their arms less in the presence of a mirror. Further research is 
required to fully understand this result, particularly given the 
indication that a mirror may be useful in pre-interview settings to 
magnify the hand-arm movements (and therefore help with 
identif cation) of those expecting to lie. Previous research has 
demonstrated that people engaged in cognitive complexity (asso- 
ciated with lying) present fewer hand and arm movements through 
the neglect of body language (Ekman, 1997; Vrij, 2008). However, in 
this instance, the mirror may have heightened self-awareness, 
which raised participants’ awareness of their postures and move- 
ment, causing them to move more. 
Based on  this  experiment,  it  was  investigated  whether 
a threshold for hand movement duration could be developed which 
would be useful for identifying liars and truth tellers. A threshold of 
196e198 s could be applied (by discounting participants on 
appropriate sides of this threshold according to Fig. 4) to correctly 
identify 53 of the 80 participants, split evenly between the self- 
awareness and deception levels (27 from the mirror condition/26 
from the no-mirror condition; 27 liars/26 truth-tellers). It is rec- 
ognised that this was applied retrospectively, and that further work 
is required to prove the validity of this approach, but it indicates 
that it may be possible to develop a threshold which could provide 
evidence to support detection of deception. Further work is 
required to  identify whether these differences are notable by 
subjective evaluation, rather than analysis using video tagging 
software. 
The mirror also resulted in an increase in whole body/torso 
movements, although no interaction was found with deception 
level. While this f nding may not be useful for identifying those 
expecting to lie, it contributes to an understanding of how people 
behave with increased levels of self-awareness. Similarly, signif - 
cant main effects were found for gaze direction, and the interaction 
between gaze direction and self-awareness, but these f ndings do 
not provide information with obvious use for detecting deceit. 
Despite the f nding that none of the body movements showed 
  
Table 11 
ANOVA for duration of whole body/torso movements. 
   
 
Deception*self-awareness 3.789 1,76 0.055  0.047 
Fig.  2. Interaction  plot  for  duration  of  hand/arm  movements:  deception*self-    
awareness. *Indicates signif cance at p < 0.05. 
  
Table 12 Table 14
 
NOVA for frequency of gaze direction. Effect F df p Eta2 
Effect F df p Eta2 Deception level 4.239 1,57 0.044* 0.069 
Gaze direction 136.183a 2,75 <0.001* 0.784 Self-awareness 0.111 1,57 0.740  0.002 
Direction*deception 0.152a 2,75 0.859 0.004 Deception*self-awareness 1.068 1,57 0.306 0.018 
Direction*self-awareness 15.388a 2,75 <0.001* 0.291 *Indicates signif cance at p < 0.05. 
Direction*deception*self-awareness 1.793a 2,75 0.174 0.046 
Deception level 0.668 1,76 0.416 0.009 
Self-awareness 7.904 1,76 0.006* 0.094 worth further research, particularly if asking participants to esti
Deception*self-awareness 1.528 1,76 0.220 0.020 mate time spent waiting can be demonstrated to provide an indi
ANOVA for duration of gaze direction. Analysis of state-trait anxiety scores. 
 
Effect F df p Eta2 Effect F df p Eta2 
Gaze direction 426.523a 2,75 <0.001* 0.919 Self-awareness 0.001 1,76 0.980 0.000 
Direction*deception 1.618a 2,75 0.205 0.041 Deception 11.969 1,76 0.001* 0.136 
Direction*self-awareness 24.877a 2,75 <0.001* 0.399 Self-awareness*deception 0.337 1,76 0.563 0.004 
Direction*deception*self-awareness 0.216a 2,75 0.806 0.006 Pre/post trial 7.164a 1,76 0.009* 0.086 
Deception 0.037 1,76 0.849 0.000 Pre/post trial*self-awareness 3.531a 1,76 0.064 0.044 
Self-awareness 1.794 1,76 0.184 0.023 Pre/post trial*deception 1.171a 1,76 0.283 0.015 
Deception*self-awareness 0.329 1,76 0.568 0.004 Pre/post trial*self-awareness*deception 0.081a 1,76 0.777 0.001 
*Indicates signif cance at p < 0.05. 
a  Pillai’s Trace. 
*Indicates signif cance at p < 0.05. 
a  Pillai’s Trace. 
  
  
Table 13 
A 
Table 15 
ANOVA for estimated time spent waiting. 
   
 
  
  
 
*Indicates signif cance at p < 0.05. 
a  Pillai’s Trace. 
   
a main effect of deception level (truth telling vs. lying), the inter- 
action in hand/arm movements suggests that self-awareness is 
worth further investigation as a possible tool for detecting decep- 
tion. Future work could investigate specif c hand/arm movements 
(for example: fold arms, tap f ngers, touch face) to determine 
whether a certain type is prevalent in those intending to deceive. 
For practicality this study used a high-level behavioural coding 
scheme, which could be broken down into further sub-categories 
for more detailed analysis. Behaviours could also be coded in 
a more subjective approach, for example, tagging when the rater 
believes the participant demonstrated signs of nervousness, rather 
than adopting the specif c movement categories used for this study. 
Future work also aims to investigate the ability of observers to 
determine subjectively (based on instinct) whether a participant is 
intending to deceive. 
This research also demonstrated that the participants who ex- 
pected to tell the truth felt that they waited longer than those who 
expected to lie. This may have been because those expecting to lie 
were actively rehearing their responses, whereas those waiting to 
tell the truth had little to occupy them. This indicates another area 
- 
- 
cation of their intention to deceive. 
The study also revealed an increase in anxiety over the 5 min 
waiting period, and that those expecting to deceive indicated 
greater anxiety than those expecting to tell the truth. This f nding 
may have use in detecting an intention to deceive, if the anxiety 
levels of suspects can be established. The greater anxiety levels in 
the deception group in this experiment were particularly inter- 
esting given the low-stakes in this experiment. There were no 
(anticipated) consequences for the participants if they were 
detected as liars, other than participants’ desire to follow the 
instructions provided and convince the experimenter they were 
telling the truth. However, this was suff cient to induce higher 
levels of anxiety. Future work should also investigate increasing 
the stakes of both groups (i.e. the consequences of getting caught 
for liars and of being believed for truth tellers) as would be the 
case in the target interview scenario. Higher stakes may be 
induced by using those which are identity-relevant to the partic- 
ipants, as these can increase participants’ motivation to succeed 
(DePaulo et al., 2003), ref ecting more accurately the conditions of 
deception prior to an interview by police or security personnel. 
This approach may also the address the use of undergraduate 
students as participants in this trial, as it is recognised that their 
incentives to deceive would differ to the target sample (i.e. crim- 
inals prior to interview). 
       
     
 
  
Fig. 3. Mean state-trait anxiety scores. Error bars indicate þ/- 1 SE. 
Fig. 4. Participants’ mean estimates of length of time they were waiting. Error bars 
indicate þ/- 1 SE. 
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5. Conclusions 
 
This paper investigated behaviours associated with intention to 
deceive while participants waited to be interviewed. Previous 
research has generally focused on behaviours demonstrated during 
an interview. This study also investigated the effects of self- 
awareness on cues to deception. An interaction was identif ed 
between deception and self-awareness for the duration of hand/ 
arm movements (F ¼ 4.335, df ¼ 1,76, p ¼ 0.041). Those expecting to 
lie moved their hands for longer when a mirror was present; the 
opposite was seen for truth-tellers. This f nding suggests that 
further research is required to understand the effects of self- 
awareness on non-verbal behaviours, as it may result in interven- 
tions which can be used to identify those intending to deceive. This 
research may ultimately improve the capability of security 
personnel to detect people acting deceptively. 
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